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INTRODUCTION

The Minnesota Supreme Court recently construed various
provisions of the Minnesota Bill of Rights,' thus demonstrating both its resolve to enforce the protections found in the
state constitution, but at the same time, a lack of consistency in
its approach to deciding state constitutional issues. For example, while State v. Hershberger2 (Hershberger I) and State v.
French3 provide the framework for analysis of article I, section
16 of the Minnesota Constitution,4 those decisions do not offer
guidance as to when the court should apply the state constitut Member, Minnesota State and Federal Bars. Ms. DeMeules recieved herJ.D.,
cum laude, 1988, from William Mitchell College of Law where she was an Editor for
the William Mitchell Law Review. She served as a Law Clerk for retired Justice Glenn
E. Kelley and Justice M. Jeanne Coyne of the Minnesota Supreme Court, 1988 to
1989, and for Chief Judge Donald P. Lay, United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, 1989 to 1990. Ms. DeMeules is currently an associate with the law
firm of Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi.
1. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) [hereinafter Hershberger
II] (MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (MINN.
CONST. art. , § 16).
2. 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
3. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
4. This clause protects Minnesota citizens' "right... to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience..." MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 16.
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tion rather than the federal Constitution to the case.5 The
travels of Hershberger through the judicial system, with two
stops at the Minnesota Supreme Court and an intervening stop
at the United States Supreme Court, illustrates the Minnesota
Supreme Court's haphazard approach to applying its state
constitution.
Minnesota's judiciary needs to develop a consistent approach to state constitutional issues. The Hershbergercase is an
unfortunate illustration of Minnesota's reluctance to ground
its decisions, when possible, in the Minnesota Constitution
rather than the federal Constitution. 6 Adopting a policy of applying state constitutional law first offers Minnesota courts the
opportunity to not only approach constitutional claims in a
consistent manner, but also to develop and declare state constitutional policy without federal oversight.7
The Minnesota judiciary, however, has avoided state constitutional claims on many occasions by deciding only the federal
claim,8 or by deciding both claims 9 under a single, unified anal5. This situation arises when a litigant bases a claim for relief on alleged violations of both a state and federal constitutional provision. See, e.g., State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989) [hereinafter Hershberger I] (state and federal
claims presented with only federal claim resolved), vacated and remanded, 110 S. Ct.
1918, aff'd on remand, 462 N.W.2d 393 (1990).
6. The Hershberger I decision is unfortunate primarily because the additional
rights afforded by the state constitution were not recognized. The decision also illustrates the inefficiency of deciding a case solely on federal grounds when a state claim
is raised. The United States Supreme Court's vacation of the Minnesota Supreme
Court's HershbergerI opinion renders the state opinion of little, if any, precedential
value. Further, the Minnesota court expended additional judicial resources on the
case when it heard oral argument for a second time to decide the state constitutional
issue. See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984). "If such a violation [of the
state constitution] did take place, much of [the state] court's first opinion and all of
this Court's opinion are for naught." Id. at 735 (Stevens, J., concurring).
7. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). In Long, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Michigan Supreme Court, which based its decision almost entirely on federal precedent. The Supreme Court stated, however, that a state
court can prevent federal review by clarifying that it is using federal precedents for
guidance only. State court decisions will not be reviewed if they are "based on bona
fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds .
I..."
Id. at 1041. "'It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state
constitutions.'" Id. (quoting Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557
(1940)).
8. See, e.g., Hershberger 1, 444 N.W.2d at 284 (Because application of the free
exercise clause of the federal Constitution "disposes of this appeal, we do not address appellant's claim that the statute as applied violates the appellant's right to
freedom of conscience guaranteed them by... the Minnesota Constitution."); Clover
Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79 (1979) (State and federal constitutional
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ysis.' 0 This approach, perhaps the result of the predominance
of federal law in constitutional litigation,'I hinders the judiciclaims were raised but the court discussed only the federal claim.), rev'd, 449 U.S. 456
(1981).
9. See, e.g., State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 661-62 (Minn. 1990) (state and
federal confrontation clause claims raised; case decided under both state and federal
law); State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1989) (state and federal confrontation
clause claims raised; case decided under federal law); State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d
509, 515 (Minn. 1989) (right to jury trial under state and federal constitutions raised;
case decided by analysis of federal precedent); Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861,
867 (Minn. 1988) (state and federal equal protection claims raised; case decided by
reference to federal law); Sisson v. Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Minn. 1988) (procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection claims raised
under both the federal and state constitutions; case decided by reference to federal
law alone); Bernthal v. City of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422, 424-45 (Minn. 1985) (state
and federal equal protection claims raised; case decided under federal precedent);
State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 851-53 (Minn. 1985), appeal
dismissed, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986) (state and federal free exercise claims raised; case
decided on federal constitutional grounds only); State v. Janetta, 355 N.W.2d 189,
193 (Minn. 1984) (search and seizure issues raised under state and federal constitutions; case decided without separating claims); Omdahl v. Hadler, 459 N.W.2d 355,
361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (equal protection challenge under state and federal constitutions; case decided by federal law analysis); Olson v. Blaeser, 458 N.W.2d 113,
117 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (court acknowledged same analysis used for state and
federal equal protection claims; case decided without identifying on which document
its analysis was based); State v. Lieder, 449 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(search and seizure challenge under state constitution); State v. Ri-Mel, Inc., 417
N.W.2d 102, 106-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (equal protection and due process claims
raised; case decided under state and federal constitutions without separating them);
Collins v. State, 385 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (state and federal selfincrimination claims raised; case decided by relying on federal precedent).
10. This single, unified analysis apparently seeks to conform interpretations of
the state constitution to interpretations of the federal Constitution when the respective constitutional provisions are similar or identical. "This court has stated that
'[tihe standards of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment are synonymous with the standards of equality under Minn. Const. art. 1, § 2 .... ' State v.
Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341, 347 n. 23 (Minn. 1977)." Bernthal, 376 N.W.2d at 424.
The state's autonomy, however, is not ignored completely. "While a United
States Supreme Court interpretation of the identical federal provision is therefore of
inherently persuasive, although not compelling, force, . . . the Minnesota Supreme
Court remains the final authority on the interpretation and enforcement of our state
constitution." Collins, 385 N.W.2d at 54-55 (citations omitted); O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (distinguishing its result from a contrary
United States Supreme Court fourth amendment case in which the Minnesota court's
analysis included federal and state decisions by noting "our decision rests not only
on the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, but also on article I,
section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution"). The O'Connor decision further demonstrates that the Minnesota court recognizes its power to reach state constitutional
claims, but typically analyzes both claims simultaneously without distinguishing the
separate purposes and policies that guide state and federal constitutions.
11. There is no single reason for the predominance of federal law in the constitutional arena. One of the most common reasons advanced is the activism of the War-
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ary's effort to provide practitioners and citizens with the direction necessary for upholding and enforcing the protections
extended by Minnesota's constitution. The too frequently
muddled analysis of constitutional claims should be replaced
with an organized approach that recognizes and preserves the
independence of the protections offered by the state bill of
rights.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recently shown a cautious return to decision making based solely on its own bill of
rights. 12 This article supports that return, and argues for even
ren Court. In this period, the United States Supreme Court paved the way for
development of individual rights and freedoms by requiring states, through the fourteenth amendment, to adhere to the guarantees in the federal Bill of Rights. See
generally 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITUrIONAL LAW-SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 15.6, at 70-79 (1986) (discussing the Supreme Court's path in ap-

plying Bill of Rights protections to the states).
The addition of federal constitutional protections provides litigants with two
possible constitutional claims for relief. Most litigants, however, rely solely on the
federal Constitution. See Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights,
9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 382 (1980) [hereinafter Linde, First Things First]. Additionally, most law school curricula focus on federal constitutional law to the exclusion of
state constitutional law. The reason for this preference for federal law is, most likely,
uniformity. Uniformity concerns do not, however, excuse the total lack of reference
to a state constitution in constitutional law courses. See, e.g., Collins, Reliance on State
Constitutions: Some Random Thoughts, DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1,

5-6 (B. McGraw ed. 1985) [hereinafter Collins, Some Random Thoughts].
12. See, e.g., State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (1990); In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d
824, 827 (Minn. 1989) ("We address the constitutional issues raised by appellant in
the instant case solely under the Minnesota Constitution .... "); Castor v. City of
Minneapolis, 429 N.W.2d 244, 245 (Minn. 1988) (applied takings clause of state constitution); State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1988) (right to twelve person
jury in misdemeanor cases protected by the Minnesota Constitution, article I, section
6);Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148 (Minn. 1988) (applied the Minnesota Constitution's right to privacy to protect a patient's right to refuse forced medication);
State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987) (recognized a right of privacy
under the Minnesota Bill of Rights); cf. Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d
448, 452 (Minn. 1988) (applied due process clause of state constitution, but referenced federal interpretation); Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 455
N.W.2d 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (applied right against self-incrimination with minimal reference to federal law), review granted, (Minn. July 6, 1990). See generally Fleming & Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: "Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist", 7 HAMLINE
L. REVIEW 51 (1984).

Hamm and Jarvis, both authored by Justice Yetka, illustrate the principle that
should guide the court in state constitutional decision making. In both opinions,
Justice Yetka stressed the importance of safeguarding the fundamental rights offered
Minnesota citizens by the state constitution:
It is important to remember that we sit today in our role as the highest
court of the State of Minnesota interpreting our own constitution, framed
and ratified by the people of this state. While a decision of the United States
Supreme Court interpreting an identical provision of the federal Constitution may be

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss1/14

4

1991]

DeMeules: Minnesota's
Variable Approach to State Constitutional Claims
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

greater use of that document' i3 The Minnesota Supreme
Court should embark on further excursions into its state constitutional jurisprudence to maintain the independent vitality
of its bill of rights. Moreover, further reliance on the state
constitution will allow the court to develop a principled
method for determining when to apply the state constitution,
or when to defer to federal decisions construing analogous
federal provisions.' 4
This article reviews the Minnesota Supreme Court's approach to decision making under the state bill of rights and
suggests a model for reviewing state constitutional claims.' 5
persuasive, it should not be automaticallyfollowed or our separate constitution will be of

little value. We may be required to interpret our own constitution more
stringently than the federal Constitution, but we certainly do not do so
lightly.... However, we must remain independently responsiblefor safeguarding the
rights of our own citizens andfor insuring that the intent of the people in Minnesota in
adopting our constitution is continuedforward. In our view, the conclusion of the
United States Supreme Court ... that the sixth amendment to the federal

Constitution does not mandate 12-person juries, is of little relevance here
today.
Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 382 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
13. Indeed, it would seem the Minnesota judiciary has a personal stake in doing
so. Otherwise, it remains bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of a particular provision, even if the Minnesota court's view differs.
To [fail to examine differing interpretations of a state constitution] is to
denigrate not only the state constitution, but the state supreme court as well
by suggesting that the earlier [state court] decision, no matter how wellreasoned, must be sacrificed to a decision by another court interpreting another constitution.
Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29
STAN. L. REV. 297, 318 (1977).

14. There is no consistent approach by the Minnesota Supreme Court to questions of state constitutional law. Compare Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 380 (raised only state
constitutional claim), andJarvis,418 N.W.2d at 148 (upheld state constitutional right
to privacy but, without explanation, did not address the federal claim), and Gray, 413
N.W.2d at 109-10 (reached state constitutional claim when intervening Supreme
Court decision eliminated the federal constitutional claim) with Hershberger I, 444
N.W.2d at 289, and State v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 851-52 (Minn.

1985) (raised both state and federal constitutional claims in each case but court effectively addressed only the federal claim). Although these cases were decided within
three years of each other, no logical method of reaching state constitutional claims
instead of federal constitutional claims can be discerned.
15. Minnesota's haphazard approach to state constitutional claims has been the
focus of an earlier commentary. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 12. The commentary and case law on this topic are extensive. Since this article focuses on Minnesota's
approach to its state constitution, few decisions from other states resolving state constitutional issues are referenced. See, e.g., People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 555
N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990) (recognizing under
the New York Constitution a due process right in favor of the state for racially balanced juries, thus the defendants' attempt to structure the racial balance of the jury
through peremptory strikes was unconstitutional); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court's recent decisions under the
state religious freedom clause are then analyzed to demonstrate the application of the decision-making approach promoted in this article. The thesis of this article is that the state
judiciary and practitioners should recognize the state bill of
rights as the primary protector of Minnesota citizens' individual liberties, and not just as a supplement to the
rights recog6
document.'
federal
analogous
nized under the
I.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. Overview of State ConstitutionalLaw
Most Minnesota citizens are likely familiar with some of the
1989) (recognizing a right to abortion under the right of privacy in Florida's constitution); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (adopting a framework
for reaching state constitutional issues over federal constitutional issues when both
presented in one case). See also Collins & Galie, Models of Post-IncorporationJudicial
Review: 1985 Survey of State ConstitutionalIndividual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV.
317 (1986) (identifying major state constitutional law developments); Developments in
the Law: The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1328
n.20 (1982) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (listing the major articles in this
field).
16. A caveat must also be offered. While a call for greater reliance on a state
constitution can be interpreted as a call for a return to the type of judicial activism
seen in earlier years,
[i]t may not be wide of the mark, however, to suppose that [state courts
returning to their state constitutions] discern, and disagree with, a trend in
recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court to pull back from, or at
least suspend for the time being, [certain federal constitutional protections].
Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489,
495 (1977). This article does not specifically propose such a result. Instead, the
intended purposes of this article are to increase awareness of the functional importance of Minnesota's Bill of Rights, and to develop a consistent and principled analysis of state constitutional claims based on the theory that state constitutional claims
are primary to, and independent of, the federal Constitution.
One commentator criticizes Justice Brennan's advocacy of state constitutional
interpretation as a veiled request for further expansion of individual rights and liberties. "Brennan's primary message thus becomes clear: state courts should vindicate
personal liberties along the lines undertaken by the Warren Court by reading their
state constitutions expansively and should justify their actions by referring to the
'neutral' principle of federalism." Maltz, False Prophet -Justice Brennan and the Theory
of State ConstitutionalLaw, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 432 (1988). The possibility
of state court reaction to Supreme Court rulings, either through expansive or restrictive interpretations of state constitutions, cannot be denied. See, e.g., French, 460
N.W.2d at 8 (uncertainty of federal freedom of religion jurisprudence noted, and
decision based on state constitutional provision). Professor Maltz' criticism ofJustice
Brennan's argument, however, fails to acknowledge that regardless of one's agreement with the reason for the differing interpretation, the state retains the authority to
disagree with or reject the Supreme Court's analysis of an analogous provision.
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constitutional rights which protect them against unwanted or
undesirable interference by the government in their personal
lives. The popularity of police and lawyer television shows has
acquainted people with their "Miranda" rights. Yet, most people are probably aware of only their federal, as opposed to
state, constitutional rights.' 7 This ignorance is reinforced by
the tendency of some state courts to view United States
Supreme Court opinions as dispositive of any constitutional
claims, even state constitutional claims.' "It is easier for state
judges and for lawyers to go along with the United States
Supreme Court than
19 to strike out on their own to analyze the
state constitution.'
In fact, both state2' and federal courts 2 ' recognize the au17. See, e.g., Collins, Some Random Thoughts, supra note 11, at 5. Professor Collins
argues that constitutional law has become "lopsided" due to an assumption that if an
act does not offend the federal Constitution, there is no constitutional infringement.
See also Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165,
174-75 (1984) [hereinafter Linde, E Pluribus]. Justice Linde, of the Oregon Supreme
Court, demonstrates the dominance of federal law by pointing to citizens' desire to
"take the fifth," or journalists' invocation of their "first amendment rights." Id. Citizens think and speak in the language of federal constitutional rights without reference to state constitutional rights. In fact, however, state constitutions may offer
additional protections beyond those of the federal Constitution. For example, the
Minnesota Bill of Rights provides its citizens with a "certain remedy in the laws for all
injuries or wrongs." See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8.

18. See, e.g., Hershberger1, 444 N.W.2d at 284 (resolution of federal claim disposed
of need to address state constitutional claim); see also Collins, Some Random Thoughts,
supra note 11, at 2 (noting state courts' tendency to make a "federal case" out of state
law issues). Of course, the issues a state court should resolve, and the issues the state
court can resolve, depend a great deal on the claims raised by the attorneys in the
case. See Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 715 (1983) (pointing out that court is hampered in its ability to
review state constitutional claims where the attorneys raise only federal constitutional
claims).
19. Abrahamson, Reincarnationof State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 964 (1982).
20. See, e.g., State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. 1988); O'Connor v.
Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979).
21. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 735-39 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (State courts should decide state constitutional issues under their respective constitutions even though an identical provision exists in the federal Constitution.); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (States may
exercise police power or sovereign right to adopt constitutional provisions for individual liberties that are more expansive than those conferred by the federal Constitution.); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 396 (1976) (Marshall, J.,dissenting)
(United States Supreme Court ruling on a federal constitutional issue does not preclude a state from resolving the issue to the contrary under its own constitution.);
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Supreme Court
should not review state supreme court decision concerning its own state constitutional issues.); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (States may require
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thority of state courts to interpret their state constitutions to
extend greater protections than those provided by analogous
federal provisions. This authority makes the continued reliance on federal constitutional law to the exclusion of state constitutional law, or the mixed analysis of state and federal
constitutional claims, even more puzzling. The reliance on
United States Supreme Court decisions construing a federal
provision to resolve a state constitutional claim implies that
state-created rights are dependent on the federal Constitution.22 In contrast, during the early history of this country the
states' bills of rights were viewed as the broad protectors of
citizens' rights and liberties, with the federal Constitution intended to plug any gaps.2 3 With the functional independence
of states' bills of rights obscured by the surge of federal law,
however, state courts began to adopt the analysis and rules of
higher standards than those required under the federal Constitution and when those
standards are violated a state may review the issue under its own constitution without
review by the Supreme Court.).
22. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 15, at 1328 (The dominance of
federal constitutional law raised questions as to the relevance of state constitutions'
bills of rights.). In fact, the opposite scenario is more plausible: federal constitutional law, at its beginning, was dependent on the analysis and results developed by
state courts construing analogous state constitutional provisions. See Abrahamson,
HomegrownJustice: The State Constitution, DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW
306, 311 (1985) [hereinafter Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice]. Justice Abrahamson,

of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, points out that some states had adopted criminal
procedural rights decades prior to the landmark federal decisions in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The United
States Supreme Court, while charting new territory in federal constitutional law, was
only adopting a uniform national standard based on the decisions and experiences of
state courts. Abrahamson, HomegrownJustice,supra, at 311. See also Upton, 466 U.S. at
738 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Whatever protections [the state constitution] does
confer are surely disparaged when the [state supreme court] refuses to adjudicate
their very existence because of the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution
of the United States."); Linde, First Things First,supra note 11, at 382 (states applied
the individual guarantees provided by their own constitutions long before federal Bill
of Rights was applied to the states).
23. This fact is well-documented and accepted in the state constitutional literature. See, e.g., Cohen, More Myths of Parity: State Court Forums and ConstitutionalActions
for the Right to Shelter, 38 EMORY LJ. 615, 619 (1989) (participants at Constitutional
Convention thought a federal Bill of Rights would be superfluous in light of the protections afforded by state constitutions); Linde, E Pluribus,supra note 17, at 174; Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the
Washington Declaration of Rights, DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 239,
243 (1985) [hereinafter Utter, Freedom and Diversity] (early constitutional history of the

United States proves that state declarations of rights were never intended to be dependent on or interpreted in light of United States Bill of Rights); Developments in the
Law, supra note 15, at 1327-28.
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law announced by the United States Supreme Court in federal
constitutional cases, without engaging in any independent
analysis of the relevant state provision.24
Recent years, however, have seen a revival of state constitutions. Several developments occurring during the late 1970s
created a resurgence in decision making based on state constitutions. 25 Furthermore, recent United States Supreme Court
decisions have reflected a retreat from, or at least reluctance
to, expanding the individual rights and liberties recognized by
the Warren Court. Such decisions have resulted in state courts
seeking additional room in their state constitutions for certain
individual liberties.26

United States Supreme Court review of state court decisions
may also have sparked the revived interest in state constitutions.27 Although Supreme Court review is generally limited
24. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987) (Minnesota
Supreme Court applied analysis and rules of law used by the United States Supreme
Court to determine scope of the right to privacy under Minnesota's constitution);
State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 770-71 (Minn. 1986) (Minnesota Supreme Court
applied United States Supreme Court analysis and rules to determine scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination); State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735,
738 n.6 (Minn. 1981) (protection of free speech guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution no more extensive than the federal Constitution); Willette v. The Mayo Foundation, 458 N.W.2d 120, 122-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (analyzed due process and
remedies claims brought under state and federal constitutions without indicating to
which claim the analysis pertained); Olson v. Blaeser, 458 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990) (noted that analysis "is the same for state and federal equal protection claims," but failed to address the claims separately).
25. For an example of the extent of this resurgence, see Developments in the Law,
supra note 15, at 1328 n.20 (a partial list of commentators discussing this topic).
26. See, e.g., State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 1990) (avoided federal issue
given unforeseeable changes in federal law). The state court reaction to Supreme
Court interpretations of constitutional rights has been called the "new federalism."
Some critics suggest that this rediscovery of state constitutions is nothing more than
a reaction to unpopular civil rights decisions and judicial activism by the United
States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 16. Justice Shirley Abrahamson, of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, contends the new federalism is not so much a liberal
reaction to the federal courts' retrenchment on constitutional rights as a doctrine
based on the concept of strong state governments. Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice,
supra note 22, at 307. A state constitution first policy encourages stability for the
citizens of a state, since the state does not have to adapt to the changing political
nature of the federal courts, and also recognizes the local expertise of state courts.
Id. at 311.
27. The Minnesota Supreme Court has experienced Supreme Court review of
cases where state law issues were either presented or decided. See, e.g., HershbergerI,
444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), vacated and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 1918, aff'd on remand,

462 N.W.2d 393 (1990); State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340 (Minn. 1982), rev'd and
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to issues of federal law, Michigan v. Long28 clarified that state
court decisions are subject to Supreme Court review unless
based on both an adequate and independent state ground.29
This rule of review makes even more dangerous the practice of
resolving state and federal constitutional claims without a separate analysis of the individual claims presented.
B.

The Approaches to State ConstitutionalIssues

State courts have turned increasingly to state constitutions
to resolve the constitutional issues presented. In doing so,
however, the court must decide the role federal law will play in
state constitutional interpretation and adjudication. Minnesota's increasing reliance on its bill of rights is welcome, but
does not fully resolve the problems the judiciary faces when
presented with competing constitutional claims. Courts which
have relied heavily on federal constitutional law in the recent
past have little state precedent to guide their analysis of undeveloped state constitutional provisions and the application of
those provisions to the claims presented.30 The United States
remanded, 465 U.S. 420 (1984); Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79
(Minn. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
28. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
29. Id. at 1041. The Long Court announced an almost formalistic rule that requires state courts to declare that their decision is based solely on state law in order
to avoid federal review. Id. This rule, while technically demanding, cannot be
faulted in view of state court opinions that fail to provide a clear analysis of the federal and state issues presented. See, e.g., State v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d
844, 851-53 (Minn. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986) (addressed only federal
issue when presented with both state and federal constitutional challenges). The
Sports & Health Club decision illustrates opinion writing that fails to meet the Supreme
Court's demand for a clear statement of the legal basis for the court's opinion. See
Note, Fulfilling the Goals of Michigan v. Long: The State Court Reaction, 56 FORDHAM L.

REV. 1041, 1046-47 (1988).
30. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, prior to Hershberger I, 462
N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) and State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), had not
decided a case based solely on the religious freedom clause, article I, section 16 of
the state constitution for over twenty years. Of course, the state court can still draw
on state constitutional cases decided prior to the heavy impact of federal jurisprudence on constitutional litigation. These cases did not, however, identify an approach to resolving competing constitutional claims because the issue of a possible
federal constitutional claim was rarely raised. Therefore, older cases, while still
"good law," offer only guidance in deciding the state claim once the state court decides the role played by federal law in state constitutional jurisprudence.
The state court can take guidance from its analysis of state constitutional provisions with no analogous federal counterpart. For example, the Minnesota Constitution guarantees its citizens a "certain remedy" at law. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8
("Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the law for all injuries or wrongs
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Supreme Court's interpretations of analogous federal provisions may guide the court's decision-making process. The
danger the state court must avoid, however, is allowing its constitution to simply "mirror" the federal Constitution by adopting without critical analysis the interpretations and rules
federal courts follow in similar cases."' Therefore, the important decision the state court must make is the degree of guidance it will take from federal constitutional jurisprudence.32
A method of analysis must be developed to guide the court's
approach to state constitutional claims. Fortunately, the revival of state constitutional law has led to the emergence of three
possible methods of analysis.
1.

The Primacy Model

The primacy model is based on the principle that, where
state law addresses and resolves an issue, federal law and any
federal claims presented are irrelevant. This approach, advocated initially by Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme
Court, views the state constitution as entirely distinct from the
body of federal constitutional law.33 A state court's decision to
")...
The Minnesota Supreme Court has a well-developed body of case law that
.
utilizes state constitutional history and policy in analyzing the protections offered by
this clause. See, e.g., Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn.
1986) (analyzed MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8 in connection with MINN. STAT. § 145.424
(1984)); Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Minn. 1982) (analyzed
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8 in connection with MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (1980)); Rambaum
v. Swisher, 423 N.W.2d 68, 73-74 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 435 N.W.2d 19, 24
(Minn. 1989) (analyzed MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8 in connection with MINN. STAT.
§ 604.07 (1986)); Kleeman v. Cadwell, 414 N.W.2d 433, 438-39 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (analyzed MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8 in connection with MINN. STAT. § 604.07
(1986)); Johnson v. Farmers Union Cent. Exchange, Inc., 414 N.W.2d 425, 429-31
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (analyzed MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8 in connection with MINN.
STAT. § 604.07 (1986)); Troupe v. Sunrise Elec., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985) (analyzed MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8 in connection with MINN. STAT.
§ 176.061, subd. 6(c) (1982)).
31. See, e.g., infra note 54.
32. A state court facing state constitutional law issues must also resolve the order
in which competing state and federal constitutional claims will be decided, and the
principles that guide construction of state constitutional protections in order to avoid
federal review. These issues, and others, are all interrelated to the development of a
consistent method of analyzing state constitutional claims. See Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 23, at 240; Note, Federalism, Uniformity, and the State Constitution, 62
WASH. L. REV. 569, 572 (1987) (discussing factors that state courts must consider
when creating an analytical procedure to interpret its constitution).
33. See generally Linde, E Pluribus,supra note 17 (discussing the legitimacy ofjudicial review of constitutional questions by the United States Supreme Court); Linde,
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depart from federal law, therefore, does not depend on the
United States Supreme Court's recognition of the state's ability to provide greater protection under its own bill of rights
than is available under federal law.3 4 Instead, Justice Linde argues that the state court does not need the federal court's
"permission" to interpret its state constitution differently since
the state court already has that authority as an independent
judiciary. 5 Thus, the rights guaranteed by the state constitution are viewed as independent of, rather than supplemental
to, the rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution. 6 "The
right question is not whether a state's guarantee is the same as
or broader than its federal counterpart as interpreted by the
Supreme Court. The right question is what the state's
guaran37
tee means and how it applies to the case at hand."
The primacy model claims judicial efficiency in its favor as
the state court need only address the issues necessary to resolve the case. For example, if the state court addresses the
First Things First, supra note 1 I (emphasizing the principle that state bills of rights
should come before the federal Bills of Rights in addressing constitutional claims).
34. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). "Our reasoning... does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State... to adopt in its
own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the
Federal Constitution." Id. See also State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn.
1986) (cited Pruneyardbut declined to depart from federal precedent in construing
state provision against self-incrimination); State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726-27
(Minn. 1985) (cited Pruneyardas authority for its ability to depart from federal precedent and independently interpret its own state constitution, but declined to do so
when construing the state double jeopardy clause); State v. Schroepfer, 416 N.W.2d
491, 493 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (cited Pruneyardbut declined to adopt federal law's
pretrial procedure following a defendant's request for a mistrial); State v. Gabbert,
411 N.W.2d 209, 213-14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (cited Pruneyardbut declined to adopt
federal law's good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
35. See Linde, E Pluribus, supra note 17, at 176.
36. See Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 23, at 243.

37. Linde, E Pluribus, supra note 17, at 179. A variation but close relation of the
primacy model is illustrated by former Justice Brennan's theory of state constitutional law. Justice Brennan's approach also calls for state court vigilance with respect
to their citizens' state constitutional rights. "[S]tate courts cannot rest when they
have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending
beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law." Brennan, supra note 16, at 491. Justice Brennan suggests, however, that federal constitutional rights should be viewed as the "floor," or the point below which the state court
cannot venture. Thus, the state court is free to interpret its constitutional protections as rising above the federally established floor, or at the very least, leveling off
with the floor. Id. at 502. The pure primacy model advocated by Justice Linde is at
odds with Justice Brennan's theory to the extent that Justice Brennan begins by determining the minimal federal standards.
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federal question first, the court will generally also address the
state law question if only to note that the state constitutional
issue is resolved by the federal discussion.38 When the state
law question is addressed first, however, it is unnecessary to
address the federal question, since an opinion on the federal
issue becomes only advisory; resolution of the state claims renders the federal claims superfluous.3 9 This result is a corollary
to the rule that an appellate court should refrain from opinions
on constitutional issues when some other resolution of the
case renders that opinion unnecessary. The primacy model
therefore advocates addressing and resolving state issues first,
followed, if necessary, by federal issues. This system results
not only in organized, structured opinions, but also in opinions that address only those issues necessary to the resolution
of the case.
The primacy model further places the responsibility for development of state law on the shoulders of the states. This is a
38. See, e.g., Hershberger 1, 444 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989), vacated and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 1918, aff'd on remand, 462 N.W.2d 393 (1990); McDonnell v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 460 N.W.2d 363, 368-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). Of course,
in the unfortunate case where the state claim is not addressed because the federal
claim disposes of the case, the state court may be faced with additional work if the
United States Supreme Court vacates its federally based decision. See, e.g., Hershberger
1,444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), vacated and remanded, 110 S.Ct. 1918, on remand,
Hershberger II, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340
(1982), rev'd and remanded, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), on remand, 380 N.W.2d 766 (1986)
(decided state law claim in line with analogous federal provision); In reJenison, 265
Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515, vacated and remanded, 375 U.S. 14, on remand, 267 Minn.
136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963) (decided state's interest in obtaining competent jurors
in line with the first amendment of the federal Constitution).
39. See Collins, Some Random Thoughts, supra note 11, at 34 n.65. See, e.g., McDonnell, 460 N.W.2d at 367-68. In McDonnell, several constitutional challenges were
raised to the state's implied consent law. The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed
the state and federal claims differently for each claim. Thus, the court first addressed
the state and federal right to counsel claims under the sixth amendment. Id. at 367.
This analysis included only one paragraph on the state constitutional claim. The
court concluded the sixth amendment analysis stating "[t]his court will not extend
the state constitutional right to counsel beyond the bounds recognized by the [Minnesota] supreme court." Id. at 368. Next, the court addressed the self-incrimination
claims by separately analyzing the state and federal claims, even though the court
acknowledged that the state claim had not been raised in the trial court. Id. at 36870. Finally, the court addressed the equal protection claims, but never identified
whether those claims were brought under the state and/or the federal constitutions.
Id. at 374.
Efficiency concerns seem to dictate that the court should adopt one approach to
identifying, addressing, and resolving the claims presented. The McDonnell court's
approach, utilizing three different methods in one opinion, represents an inefficient,
and perhaps confusing method of constitutional analysis.
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logical placement of this burden since, as independent governments, states are traditionally responsible for those developments.4" Thus, "a state court always is responsible for the law
of its state before deciding whether the state falls short of a
national standard, so that no federal issue is properly reached
when the state's law protects the claimed right."'"
The distinctive feature of the primacy model is its view that
the state constitution is autonomous from its federal counterpart.42 This unbridled assertion of superiority over the federal
Constitution, to the extent that federal claims are unresolved,
has drawn criticism. Some commentators suggest that deciding a state constitutional issue without reference to the welldeveloped body of federal law renders the state decision less
convincing and inefficient.4" Other commentators suggest that
to avoid the body of federal constitutional law does not reflect
the reality of constitutional jurisprudence, "for the very vocabulary of constitutional law is a federal vocabulary." 44
40. See Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 23, at 247.

41. Linde, E Pluribus, supra note 17, at 178.
42. The corollary of this viewpoint requires that practitioners present state constitutional claims prior to federal claims. This approach is argued most forcefully by
Professor Collins.
Aside from the fact that state law does not cease to be law simply because it
coexists with the federal Constitution, there are practical reasons why courts
should encourage the complaining party to address state law prior to federal.... [T]oday's resolution of a federal claim does not answer the question raised by tomorrow's factually identical case brought under state law.
Collins, Some Random Thoughts, supra note 11, at 8. Thus, when only the federal claim
is presented, practitioners present an incomplete picture and, correspondingly, present an inadequate opportunity for the appellate court.
43. These propositions were stated best as follows:
When federal protections are extensive and well articulated, state court decision making that eschews consideration of, or reliance on, federal doctrine
not only will often be an inefficient route to an inevitable result, but also will
lack the cogency that a reasoned reaction to the federal view could provide,
particularly when parallel federal issues have been exhaustively discussed by
the Supreme Court and commentators.
Developments in the Law, supra note 15, at 1357. Another commentator suggests that
state courts can assist federal courts in development of federal constitutional analysis
by commenting on similar state constitutional provisions. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws
of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal ConstitutionalIssues when Disposing of Cases
on State ConstitutionalGrounds, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1025, 1030-41 (1985) [hereinafter Utter, Swimming in the Jaws].
44. Spaeth, Toward a New Partnership: The Future Relationship of Federal and State

Constitutional Law, 49 U. Prr. L. REV. 729, 736 (1988). The author argues that the
pervasive nature of federal constitutional law has caused most citizens to think of
their federal citizenship and rights before their respective state citizenship and rights.
Therefore, he argues, "[wie simply cannot reason or argue about what state constitutional law should be without resort to principles of federal constitutional law, for the
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The InterstitialModel

The interstitial model views state constitutional law as a vehicle for filling gaps in federal constitutional law. Thus, in
contrast to the priority asserted by advocates of the primacy
model, state constitutional law occupies a secondary position,
to be used as a means of supplementing or clarifying federal
law. 4 5 Federal law is viewed as the floor, not to be departed
from unless factors warranting elaboration of state constitu46
tional doctrine dictate a different result.
Advocates of the interstitial model argue that it is grounded
in the reality of the dominant role of federal law in constituvery vocabulary of constitutional law is a federal vocabulary." Id. This conclusion
seems to beg the question. Admittedly, constitutional law is a federal vocabulary, but
only because the actors in the system-judges, lawyers, and law schools-have placed
an overwhelming emphasis on the federal Constitution in the last fifty years. Prior to
that time, state courts did not hesitate to look to their state constitutions to protect
their citizens. Further, Judge Spaeth's conclusion ignores the form of government
adopted by the states:
The really distinctive feature of the federal government by contrast with the
states is that its powers are carefully enumerated and delegated ....

By

contrast all other governmental powers not thus delegated to the federal
government are by constitution declared to belong [to the states] ....The
federal government therefore by no constitutional possibility can add to or
diminish the powers of the states ....
J. DEALEY, GROWTH OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITTIONs 3-4 (1915). Although Judge
Spaeth supports the call for reexamination of state constitutions, his criticism of the
primacy model's lack of deference to federal law is part of the reason why state constitutions have fallen into disuse. Supporters of the primacy model argue that the
"federal vocabulary" was developed only because of state court inertia in the area of
state constitutional law. See, e.g., Collins, Some Random Thoughts, supra note 11, at 3-4.
45. See Developments in the Law, supra note 15, at 1357-58. This model has also
been described as the reactive or independent approach. See also Maltz, supra note 16,
at 439-40.
46. Developments in the Law, supra note 15, at 1358. The authors of this comment
propose the following analysis:
The interstitial model proposes three questions that the state court
should address sequentially when presented with a state constitutional issue.
First, do established principles of federal law dictate a result; that is, does
the alleged unconstitutional action fall below a federal floor? If so, the case
can be decided without the elaboration of state constitutional doctrine. If
not, the second question asks what factors, if any, warrant a divergence from
federal doctrine. If the court identifies reasons to diverge, the final question
is how to proceed in elaborating the contours of the state constitutional doctrine ....
Id.
The authors of an earlier article on Minnesota's Bill of Rights advocated an approach similar to the interstitial model, although not denominated as such. These
authors suggest that the Minnesota courts consider several state specific factors to
decide whether departure from federal doctrine is warranted. See Fleming & Nordby,
supra note 12.
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tional litigation. "In a community that perceives the Supreme
Court to be the primary interpreter of constitutional rights, reliance on Supreme Court reasoning can help to legitimate state
'47
constitutional decisions that build on the federal base."
This model, however, suffers from two major drawbacks.
First, by asserting the primacy of federal constitutional law-in
the sense that the case should be disposed of on federal
grounds if possible-the interstitial model abdicates the functional independence of the state constitution. Thus, even
though a state claim is raised, the interstitial model views that
claim as irrelevant if the case can be disposed of on federal
grounds.48 Second, this model is at odds with the Supreme
Court's principles of reviewing cases involving state and federal constitutional issues. If a state court, following the interstitial model, allows federal law to control its analysis of the
state constitutional issue,
the state court risks Supreme Court
49
review and reversal.

The interstitial model, also, creates the possibility of useless
advisory opinions where the Supreme Court accepts jurisdiction of a case decided by reliance on federal law or by mixing
the analysis of federal and state claims. If the Supreme Court
reverses and remands the case, the state court is free to adopt
the same initial result by relying exclusively on state law prece47. Developments in the Law, supra note 15, at 1357.
48. This is arguably the approach taken by the Minnesota court in HershbergerI,
444 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989) (state claim not analyzed because case disposed
of on federal grounds), vacated and remanded, 110 S.Ct. 1918, aff'd on remand, 462
N.W.2d 393 (1990).
49. See Collins, Some Random Thoughts, supra note 11, at 13. In Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983), the Supreme Court declared that it would take jurisdiction over state cases deciding constitutional rights, even if based on state grounds,
if the "state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be
interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any
possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion ...." This rule
requires state courts to state explicitly that their holding is based on state law, and
that federal law, if cited at all in an opinion, was referred to only for guidance. Id. at
1041.
Minnesota has experienced this risk of review on several occasions. See, e.g.,
Hershberger 1, 444 N.W.2d at 282; State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340 (Minn. 1982),
vacated and remanded, 465 U.S. 420 (1984); Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289
N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979), revd,449 U.S. 456 (1981); In reJenison, 265 Minn. 96, 120
N.W.2d 515, vacated and remanded, 375 U.S. 14 (1963). In each case, Supreme Court
review and the additional work involved on remand could have been avoided by basing the initial decision on the state claim presented in the case. Ultimately, the state
claim was relied on in the remand cases in Hershberger 11, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.
1990), and State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 1986).
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dent, thus rendering both the first state court opinion and the
Supreme Court opinion advisory. 0
The interstitial model, in contrast to the judicial efficiency
advocated by the primacy model, suffers from a degree ofjudicial inefficiency. Its advocates argue, however, that this model
offers the ability to resort to a well-developed body of law that
can guide a court's decision-making process. A careful analysis
of Supreme Court precedent of an analogous federal provision
can help a state court reach a well-reasoned decision under its
own constitution. This method of decision making, while cautious, helps to avoid analytically unsound decisions."
3.

The Lockstep Approach

The lockstep approach views the state constitution's protections as fully consistent with the United States Supreme
Court's interpretations of analogous federal constitutional
protections. Thus, changes and modifications in federal law
lead to the same changes or modifications in state law.5 2 This
approach typifies Minnesota's approach to many constitutional
issues in the sense that the court will typically resolve the constitutional issues raised under two different constitutions by relying exclusively on precedent construing the analogous
federal provision, 3 or by holding with minimal analysis that
54
the protections under the two constitutions are synonymous.
50. See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 735 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Note, Fulfilling the Goals of Michigan v. Long: The State Court Reaction, 56
FORDHAM L. REv. 1041, 1042-44 (1988). The author of this Note points out the
difficulty encountered by state courts faced with federal and state constitutional
claims. Some courts operating without an organized approach to the constitutional
issues resolve the case without specifically identifying on which constitutional provision the analysis is based. Id. at 1063-65. This type of analysis leaves the state court
open to the Supreme Court's Michigan v. Long jurisdiction, resulting in the inefficient
and useless rendering of advisory opinions. Furthermore, this type of analysis fails to
give the state constitution the respect it deserves. Id. at 1068-69.
51. See Developments in the Law, supra note 15, at 1357.
52. Maltz, supra note 16, at 437-38.
53. See, e.g., State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1989) (confrontation clause
issue); State v.Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 1989) (jury trial right); Lienhard v.
State, 431 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. 1988) (equal protection issues); State v. Murphy, 380
N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 1986) (self-incrimination challenge); State v. Sports & Health
Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (1985) (free exercise challenge).
54. An example of this is seen in the analysis of claims brought under the equal
protection clauses of the Minnesota Bill of Rights, and the federal Bill of Rights. In
Bernthal v. City of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1985), where the plaintiff raised
equal protection claims under both constitutions, the court stated: "The standards
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The lockstep approach has received the most criticism for its
apparent abdication to the federal judiciary of state constitutional development. 5 This approach also creates difficulties
for the state supreme court in terms of its workload and autonof the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment are synonymous with the
standards of equality under MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 2 ....
Id. at 424 (quoting State
v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341, 347 n.23 (Minn. 1977)). In Forge, the court relied on
Minneapolis Federation of Teachers, Local 59 v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347, 354,
147 N.W.2d 358, 363 (1966), which in turn relied on C. Thomas Stores Sales System,
Inc. v. Spaeth, 209 Minn. 504, 514, 297 N.W. 9, 16 (1941). The Spaeth court relied
on National Tea Co. v. State, 205 Minn. 443, 447-48, 286 N.W. 360, 362 vacated, 308
U.S. 547 (1939),judgment reinstated on rehearing, 208 Minn. 607, 294 N.W. 230 (1940),
and State v. Bridgeman & Russell Co., 117 Minn. 186, 134 N.W. 496 (1912).
Therefore, Bernthal's statement ultimately relies on the validity of National Tea
and Bridgeman & Russell. However, National Tea is a taxation case and did not involve
the application of article I, § 2 of the Minnesota Bill of Rights. See National Tea Co.,
205 Minn. at 446-47, 286 N.W. at 362.
Bridgeman & Russell, while involving both article I, § 2 and the fourteenth amendment, does not state on which constitutional provision its analysis is based. Nor does
the case state that the provisions are to be construed analogously. Thus, the justification for construing the Minnesota equal protection clause synonymously with its federal counterpart has not yet been offered. This is particularly curious when the
synonymously construed clauses are so textually different. Article I, § 2 of the Minnesota Bill of Rights states, "No member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof ....
MINN.
CONsT. art I, § 2.
In contrast, the federal equal protection clause is derived from the fourteenth
amendment, which states,
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (1987). Yet, without offering any analysis of the
clauses, the history of the protection, or the policies of the state and federal government in assuring equal protection, Minnesota courts continue to follow the federal
law in this area. See, e.g., Lienhard, 431 N.W.2d at 867 (stating that limitation on tort
claims not violative of plaintiff's right to equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment); see also State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 738 n.6 (Minn.
1981) (without analysis or support, stating that free speech protection in Minnesota
Bill of Rights construed synonymously with analogous federal protection); State v.
Scholberg, 412 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (following Century Camera).
55. See, e.g., Collins, Some Random Thoughts, supra note 11, at 5-6; Maltz, supra note

16, at 440. Professor Maltz sees the lockstep approach, along with the other approaches, as a choice between options for delegating lawmaking authority. He suggests that "activist" courts (apparently those that reject the Supreme Court's
approach to a constitutional issue) advocate judicial lawmaking authority, as opposed
to legislative lawmaking authority. Maltz, supra note 16, at 441-43. States which take
the lockstep approach take "account of an unalterable reality-the existence of federal judicial review-in determining the allocation of authority among state governing bodies." Id. at 443. Thus, since the lockstep state follows the Supreme Court
consistently, federal judicial review is always available, albeit perhaps in an unrelated
case, and state judicial lawmaking is therefore unnecessary. "State courts employing
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omy. First, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Michigan v. Long allows its intervention to the extent that the
state court declares state constitutional rights coterminous
with federal rights without actually analyzing state law.5 6 Second, a state supreme court faced with reversal by the United
States Supreme Court loses a certain degree of autonomy as
the court with the final word on the litigants' state constitutional rights.5 7 Further, the state supreme court is perhaps
viewed as subject to the changing political whims of the United
States Supreme Court which responds to a national constituency, rather than to a smaller regional constituency. 8
C. A Model of Adjudicationfor Minnesota
The Minnesota Supreme Court's current approach to claims
based on the Minnesota Bill of Rights has at least been diverse.
The court's recent willingness to address state constitutional
claims raised by litigants is hampered by its past failure to provide clear guidelines on its approach to resolving these
claims.5 9 The court often does not address the state and fedlockstep analysis simply choose to allocate maximum power to their state legislatures." Id.
The difficulty with Professor Maltz' theory is in its reliance on federal judicial
review. He suggests no reason why a state court interpreting a state constitution
should rely on federal judicial review to resolve any problems in its state constitutional interpretation. Reliance on federal judicial review to define the parameters of
state constitutional protections seems to be the height of abdication of judicial responsibility for a state constitution by a state court.
56. This problem results in repeat appearances of cases before the state court.
See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340 (Minn. 1982), vacated and remanded, 465
U.S. 420 (1984), rev'don remand, 380 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 1986) (Since the federal and
state self-incrimination constitutional provisions are identical, the court was required
to rehear and use federal decisions for guidance.); In reJenison, 265 Minn. 96, 120
N.W.2d 515, vacated and remanded, 375 U.S. 14, rev'd on remand, 267 Minn. 136, 125
N.W.2d 588 (1963) (The court relied on federal precedent to hold that constitutional
guarantees of religious freedom permit an individual to refuse jury duty because of
religious beliefs.).
57. The loss of autonomy may have occurred when the state court failed to separately analyze the state and federal constitutional issues. See Lienhard, 431 N.W.2d at
866. This form of opinion writing may stem in part from the manner in which the
issues are presented to the court as a single constitutional issue. See, e.g., Appellant's
Brief and Appendix, Lienhard, 431 N.W.2d at 861 (No. C8-87-1002). Thus, the autonomy sacrificed is a result of practices engaged in by both the state court and attorneys appearing before that court.
58. For a discussion of the different concerns motivating the Supreme Court and
state courts, see infra note 86.
59. Of course, this assumes that attorneys appearing before the court have separately raised the state constitutional issue.
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eral constitutional issues separately, preferring instead to resolve them as one issue. 0 Obviously, counsel should routinely
raise separate state and federal constitutional claims."' This
approach presents the court with the opportunity to address
the state claim separately from the federal claim. The Minnesota judiciary, however, for the benefit of the parties appearing
before it, and in order to develop a sound body of constitutional law, still needs to adopt a consistent approach to analyzing those claims. Its current approach,6 2 while varying
between interstitial and lockstep, is deficient in several respects. The approach advocated here is the primacy model described earlier.
The primacy model would benefit Minnesota in several respects. First, this model promotes certainty in constitutional
60. See, e.g., State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 658 (Minn. 1990) (self-incrimination claims); State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 512-14 (Minn. 1989) (right to a
speedy trial); Sisson v. Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 571-74 (Minn. 1988) (self-incrimination claims); State v. Hanson, 285 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Minn. 1979) (constitutional
challenges to venue location of criminal trial); Omdahl v. Hadler, 459 N.W.2d 355,
360-61 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (due process challenges); Willette v. Mayo Found., 458
N.W.2d 120, 122-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (due process challenges); City of Edina v.
Dreher, 454 N.W.2d 621, 622 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (due process challenges); State
v. Lieder, 449 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (search and seizure challenges); State v. Jannetta, 355 N.W.2d 189, 194-95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (search
warrant challenges).
61. This article, therefore, also advocates modifying appellate briefs and arguments so that the state constitutional claims are always presented first, with the federal claims presented as alternative grounds for resolution. Cf. Appellant's Brief and
Appendix, Hershberger 1, 444 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1989), vacated and remanded, 110 S.
Ct. 1918, aff'd on remand, 462 N.W.2d 393 (1990) (No. C9-88-2623) (federal claim
briefed and argued first).
62. This approach is subject to some criticism since the court, when finding that
a state's constitutional protection is synonymous with its federal counterpart, offers
little critical analysis in reaching that decision. For example, the court has construed
the free speech protection extended by the Minnesota Constitution as no more extensive than the protection offered by the first amendment. See State v. Century
Camera Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 738 n.6 (Minn. 1981). The two constitutional provisions, however, differ dramatically. The Minnesota Constitution makes free speech
"inviolate," while the federal Constitution directs that free speech "shall not be infringed." Compare MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3 with U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also State v.
Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987) (holding that the right of privacy implicit in
the Minnesota Bill of Rights is no more extensive than the federal right of privacy as
currently construed by the United States Supreme Court); State v. Hanson, 285
N.W.2d 483, 486 (Minn. 1979) ("There seems no reason to interpret the State Constitution [differently]" from the federal Constitution concerning the location for a
criminal trial.). The Minnesota court can reach the decision it believes is most consistent with its constitution; however, to be a persuasive decision, these differences need
to be addressed and explained.
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litigation and jurisprudence. The decision-making process
under the primacy model will always resolve first the state
claim, and then, if necessary, the federal claim. Counsel currently have little guidance on the court's decision-making process when faced with concurrent federal and state
constitutional claims. It is difficult for practitioners to develop
and advance state constitutional claims when the court before
which it argues that claim does not explore the legal basis for
the claim.63 Indeed, independent state constitutional claims
that are briefed and argued by counsel can be ignored by the
court in reaching its decision. 64 The primacy model offers the
certainty of knowing that state claims will be addressed and
resolved first, and that federal claims will be reached only if
necessary.
Second, the primacy model offers the Minnesota judiciary
the unique opportunity to reacquaint itself with its constitution
and decide for itself, without the controlling hand of federal
courts or federal law, the parameters of the constitutional protections shielding Minnesota citizens. The court's current approach, focusing largely on the federal constitutional claim, is
objectionable given the resulting subordination of the state's
bill of rights. Decision making may be easier given the plethora of federal constitutional decisions which provide the
framework for the state court's analysis. 65 The continued resort to this process, however, hampers the court's ability to become familiar with and develop the protections extended by
63. In recent years, with the dominance of federal law in constitutional litigation,
the state court was often presented only with a federal constitutional claim. See, e.g.,
Appellant's Brief and Appendix, State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1989) (No.
C3-88-687), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990) (presented only federal fourth amendment
issue). Justice Linde, however, argues that this should not hinder the state court in
resolving the case on state grounds. Linde, First Things First, supra note 11, at 383.
"(The state court] owes its state the respect to consider the state constitutional question even when counsel does not raise it, which is most of the time." Id.
This approach, of course, threatens the well-established procedural rule that an
appellate court will not address an issue not raised below. Furthermore, adopting
this policy does not force attorneys to become as well-acquainted with the state constitution as the judges before whom they appear.
64. See, e.g., Hershberger1, 444 N.W.2d at 289-90 (declined to address state constitutional issue since case resolved by deciding federal constitutional issue); State v.
Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Minn. 1985) (failed to separately address state constitutional issue by relying solely on federal law for resolution of
claim).
65. See, e.g., Hershberger 1, supra note 5, at 286-89 (applied Supreme Court free
exercise challenge four-part test).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1991

21

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 14
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

the state constitution. The court has already construed several
provisions of the Minnesota Bill of Rights consistently with
Supreme Court decisions on analogous federal provisions.66
There are, however, other unique provisions that may be invoked by litigants 67 thereby requiring the court to determine
the construction of its own constitutional provisions. 8
Third, the stability encouraged by the primacy model is a
welcome benefit. The Minnesota judiciary's previous wholesale adoption of United States Supreme Court precedent and
analysis in certain constitutional areas raises questions about
the precedential value of the state court opinion when the
Supreme Court reverses itself, or takes a course different from
that adopted by the state court.6 9 For example, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Employment Division, Department of
66. See, e.g., Gray, 413 N.W.2d at 111 (right to privacy); State v. Murphy, 380
N.W.2d 766, 771 (Minn. 1986) (privilege against self-incrimination); Century Camera,
309 N.W.2d at 736, 738 n.6 (freedom of speech); Hanson, 285 N.W.2d at 486 (constitutional venue challenge); Chock v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 458 N.W.2d 692,
694 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (following Supreme Court's decision on the constitutionality of roadblocks to stop intoxicated drivers).
67. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. I, § 1 (object of government); MINN. CONST. art. I,
§ 12 (no person shall be imprisoned for debt); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (certain remedy clause); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 9 (treason clause); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 14 (military power subordinate to civil power); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 (freedom of
conscience protected); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 17 (religious tests as qualification for
office prohibited).
68. As Professor Maltz points out, the primacy model does not require ignoring
United States Supreme Court precedent. Rather, the state court has the option of
relying on Supreme Court precedent, or simply relying on the decisions of other
states construing similar state constitutional provisions. See Maltz, supra note 16, at
435-37.
69. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 460 N.W.2d 363, 370
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990), review granted, (Nov. 9, 1990); Friedman v. Commissioner of
Pub. Safety, 455 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), review granted, (July 6, 1990). McDonnell and Friedman both involved state and federal self-incrimination challenges
based on the admission of a defendant's refusal to submit to a test to determine
intoxication. These courts acknowledged that a previous Minnesota Supreme Court
decision, State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N.W.2d 863 (1973), which upheld a
self-incrimination challenge based on the admission of the defendant's refusal to take
a test had not been explicitly overruled in light of South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.
553 (1983), which reached the opposite conclusion. Further, the Minnesota
Supreme Court acknowledged that the holding in Andrews under the state constitution
was not affected by Neville. See State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 183 n.1 (Minn. 1983).
The Minnesota Court of Appeals ultimately held that Andrews was of questionable precedential value. Freidman, 455 N.W.2d at 97-98. The court further declined
"to interpret the [state constitution] more broadly than the federal constitution as to
the issue presented here as well." McDonnell, 460 N.W.2d at 370. While Andrews'
validity is doubtful, its presence and the subsequent decisions created confusion in
resolving the state constitutional claims.
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Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 70 represents a departure

from previous decisions involving the free exercise clause of
the first amendment. 7 ' The Minnesota Supreme Court has already expressed its dissatisfaction with this change in course,
and apparently retreated from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution's religious freedom clause. In
State v. French,72 the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly relied
on the Minnesota Constitution to resolve a free exercise claim
because of the United States Supreme Court's change in interpretation. "In light of the unforeseeable changes in established first amendment law set forth in recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, justice demands that we analyze
the present case in light of the protections found in the Minne73
sota Constitution.-

While the Minnesota Supreme Court can legitimately disagree with the United States Supreme Court's interpretations,
especially when the state court is construing its own constitution, the approach followed in French does not promote stability in constitutional law. Instead, the message derived from
French is that the court will resort to the state constitution only
when the court disagrees with the United States Supreme
Court, rather than whenever a state constitutional claim is
presented.
Fourth, the primacy model promotes judicial efficiency. For
example, if the state court addresses the federal question first,
the court is still obligated to address the state constitutional
law question in order to resolve the issues raised by the parties. 4 If the state constitutional law question is addressed first,
70. 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990).
71. The Smith decision seems to reverse the decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972), as well as departing from the test used to analyze free exercise
clause claims developed in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See Smith, 110 S.
Ct. at 1598-1606. This raises questions about the precedential value of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in In re Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 125 N.W.2d 588
(1964), in which the court upheld a person's right to refuse jury duty based on a first
amendment free exercise claim. The court reached this decision after the United
States Supreme Court vacated its earlier decision denying the claim and directed the
Minnesota court to reconsider the case in light of Sherbert. In In reJenison, 375 U.S.
14 (1963), the plaintiff raised both state and federal constitutional claims, but the
Minnesota Supreme Court resolved both claims by relying on federal law.
72. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
73. Id.at 8.
74. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 460 N.W.2d 363, 369-70
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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however, it is unnecessary to address the federal question since
the decision on the federal issue becomes only an advisory
opinion. 5
Finally, the decision on the state claim is also a final decision,
unreviewable by the federal court. 76 The primacy model therefore offers the Minnesota Supreme Court a protective shield
against unwanted United States Supreme Court oversight.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has already experienced the
difficulty of deciding a case by reference to federal constitutional law, and having the Supreme Court vacate the decision
and send it back for additional consideration. 7 The Supreme
Court has only been able to exercise jurisdiction over these
cases because of its policy to review state court decisions that
do not clearly invoke state law grounds as the basis for the decision. 78 A state court avoids Supreme Court review and
reserves for itself the interpretation of its state constitution by
following a state claim first policy of constitutional litigation.
This approach does not preclude reference to Supreme Court
precedent.79 Instead, the Minnesota court is free to look to
those decisions, but for guidance only. Indeed, the Long Court
suggested that its demand for an adequate and independent
state ground would encourage state courts "to develop state
jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference. . . ."

The other models used in state constitutional analysis, the
lockstep approach and the interstitial model, present disadvantages that are not outweighed by the only apparent benefit, the
state court's ability to rely on a well-developed body of federal
75. See Collins, Some Random Thoughts, supra note 11, at 34 n.65.

76. Id. at 35.
77. See supra note 38.
78. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
79. Indeed, given the similar structure and wording of certain state and federal
provisions, reference to Supreme Court decisions can be expected. Under the primacy model, however, the weight given to Supreme Court decisions is no greater
than that given to the decision of a sister state construing an analogous state constitutional provision. See, e.g., Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Awayfrom a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 14 (1981) [hereinafter Collins, Reactionary
Approach].

80. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041. Thus, to avoid Supreme Court review, the state court
relying on Supreme Court precedent must make a clear statement that it looked to
federal law for guidance only. Id. The plain statement rule thus becomes the "rubber stamp" by which state courts avoid Supreme Court review. See Case Comment,
Michigan v. Long: The Inadequacies of Independent and Adequate State Grounds, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 159, 160 (1987).
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law. Minnesota's use of the lockstep approach has resulted, on
some occasions, in duplicative work for the court when cases
are returned for further consideration."' Furthermore, the
lockstep approach can be condemned because of the resulting
diminishment of the state constitution, a result that should offend a state court concerned with interpreting and enforcing
the protections enumerated in its constitution. No jurist would
agree that the state constitution does not have the independent significance which deserves independent attention. Finally, the uniformity in constitutional law that results from the
lockstep model, since state and federal claims are resolved
analogously, is an insufficient justification for the resulting
ne8 2
glect of the development of the state constitution.
The interstitial model is dangerous in light of the Supreme
Court's willingness to review state court decisions ostensibly
based on state law grounds.8 3 The only suggested reason for
avoiding the claim that the court before which it is presented
can best resolve, 4 is the dominance of federal law in the constitutional arena.8 5 This rationale fails, however, to explain adequately why the state court, entrusted with the responsibility
for interpreting and preserving the rights enumerated in the
state constitution, should rely on the decisions
of a federal
8 6
court interpreting a different document.
81. See supra note 38.
82. See supra note 54. Indeed, it is the difference between state and federal constitutions, and state and federal judicial systems that detract from imposing uniform
interpretation requirements on those documents and bodies.
83. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1032; see also Collins, Some Random Thoughts, supra note
11, at 13. "The [interstitial] model is unstable if only because it places an unreal
demand on the bar to set aside state law to the client's detriment and expense." Id.
84. State courts are considered experts on such state-specific issues as family law,
workers compensation law, and landlord-tenant law. The requirements and rules of
these areas of law can vary widely from state to state. Thus, interpreting a state constitutional provision unique to that state should pose no difficulties for a state court.
See Collins, Reactionary Approach, supra note 79, at 14. This difference in local laws
among the states further diminishes the argument made by Judge Spaeth that federal
rights should be primary since citizens are conscious only of their federal citizenship
status. See Spaeth, supra note 44, at 734-36. In fact, citizens are more likely to be
aware of the different protections offered by their individual state.
85. See Developments in the Law, supra note 15, at 1357.

86. This is particularly puzzling in light of the fact that the United States
Supreme Court acts out of concerns different from those motivating the state courts.
See, e.g., Utter, Swimming in the Jaws, supra note 43, at 1045; Developments in the Law,

supra note 15, at 1348-51 (Supreme Court motivated by concerns of national uniformity, while state courts have only regional impact). These objective factors do not
suggest that Supreme Court decisions on analogous provisions in a different docu-
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This model also suffers from historical drawbacks. The interstitial model's relegation of the state constitution to a "fall
back" position is particularly unsettling when, historically, the
state constitution has occupied a primary position. The interstitial model requires a court to at least acknowledge that the
federal Constitution initially defines the scope of the constitutional right at issue. Since the federal courts initially looked to
the state courts to define the scope of federal rights, 7 the interstitial model takes a position that, historically, is indefensible. A state court interested in preserving its autonomy, and
avoiding United States Supreme Court review, would avoid the
interstitial model.
II.

THE RELIGION CLAUSE CASES

Minnesota's return to its state constitution is reflected in two
recent decisions, State v. Hershberger [HershbergerII],88 and State

v. French.89 The Minnesota Supreme Court based its decisions
in both cases solely on the freedom of religion clause in the
state constitution. 90 These cases are unique not only for their
exclusive reliance on the state constitution, but also due to the
relative obscurity of the religious freedom clause. 9' Thus, the
Hershberger and French cases provide a unique opportunity to
critique the Minnesota Supreme Court's reliance on and use of
its state constitution.
A critique of these opinions, however, requires an understanding of the factors that framed the court's analysis. The
leading elements in the Minnesota court's analysis of article I,
section 16, are the language of the provision at issue and the
subject matter of the litigation.92 A review of the language of
the religious freedom clause demonstrates the reason for the
prominence of these factors in the court's analysis:
The right of every man to worship God according to the
ment are entitled to any more persuasive weight than those of a state court interpreting a similar state constitutional provision.
87. See Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice, supra note 22, at 311.
88. 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
89. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
90. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 [hereinafter freedom of conscience clause].
91. See supra note 30.
92. The factors the court relied on were identified in Fleming & Nordby, supra
note 12, at 67-75. In addition, these authors also identified state constitutional history, Minnesota precedent, and conditions unique to Minnesota as factors the court
should consider. Id. at 67-77.
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dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed, ...
nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of
conscience be permitted ....
but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to . . . justify
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State
93

The strong language of this section and its mandatory tone required that the court confront the differences in text and purpose between the Minnesota Constitution and federal
Constitution. With these factors in mind, an analysis of the
French and Hershberger decisions demonstrates that the Minnesota court has laid an adequate foundation for future claims
94
based on this clause.
A.

State v. French

State v. French9 5 provided the Minnesota Supreme Court with
its first opportunity in several years to construe article I, section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution, the freedom of conscience clause.9 6 The defendant in French was a landlord who
refused to allow an unmarried couple to live in his rental property based on his religious belief that living together outside of
marriage is sinful.9 7 The prospective tenant filed a discrimination complaint with the Minnesota Human Rights Department
which issued a complaint against the defendant for marital status discrimination. 8 Both the administrative law judge and
the Minnesota Court of Appeals 9 found the defendant engaged in unlawful discrimination, with the court of appeals rejecting the defendant's constitutional challenge. 0 0
The defendant argued before the Minnesota Supreme Court
that his constitutionally protected free exercise of religion precluded imposition of any penalty for the discrimination. The
defendant's argument was based on both the first amendment
93. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16.

94. It is important to point out that this section's analysis does not critique the
merits of the court's decision, but only critiques its approach to analyzing and apply-

ing this clause.
95. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
96. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16.

97. French, 460 N.W.2d at 3-4.
98. Id. at 4. Marital status discrimination in property rental is prohibited by
MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 2(l)(a) (1990).
99. State v. French, No. C2-89-1064 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 1989).
100. Id.
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of the federal Constitution, and section 16 of the Minnesota
Constitution. 10 A plurality0 2 of the Minnesota Supreme
Court agreed with the defendant's state constitutional argument, and held that the freedom of conscience clause0 3 protected the defendant from being penalized for his acts.'
The plurality's initial approach to the state constitutional issue highlights the Minnesota judiciary's inconsistent approach
to state constitutional issues. The plurality acknowledged that
the defendant in French "emphasized" the federal constitutional issue, but decided that it would only address the state
constitutional issue: "In light of the unforeseeable changes in
established first amendment law set forth in recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, justice demands that we analyze the present case in light of the protections found in the
°
Minnesota Constitution. 104
This approach is curious at best,
and leaves the court open to criticism that it is result-oriented.
By acknowledging that it avoided the federal issue simply because of unforeseen changes in federal law, the court implicitly
acknowledged its disagreement with those changes. That disagreement suggests that the court would not have turned to
state law but for those changes.
The primacy model eliminates these undercurrents from a
court's opinion. The primacy model's state law first policy allows the court to always turn to state law regardless of any
changes in federal law. The French court's apparent need to
distinguish itself from federal law would have been unnecessary had the Minnesota judiciary not been so entrenched in addressing and resolving federal issues prior to state law issues.
Aside from the plurality's introductory problem, its analysis
of the freedom of conscience clause is well structured. The
plurality looked initially to the language of the clause and its
historical importance to guide its interpretation. 0 5 The plurality recognized that the language of this section is considera101. French, 460 N.W.2d at 8.
102. Justice Yetka, joined by Justices Kelley and Coyne, held that the marital status discrimination prohibited by MINN. STAT. § 363.03 does not encompass cohabiting couples, and that article I, section 16 protected the landlord's actions. Id. at 11.
Justice Simonett joined in the plurality's decision on the statutory issue, but, finding
that issue dispositive, did not join the constitutional decision. Id. Chief Justice Popovich and Justices Wahl and Keith dissented from the court's holding. Id. at 11, 21.
103. Id. at 11.
104. Id.at 8.
105. Id. at 8-9.
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bly broader than its federal counterpart,

which simply

prohibits any "law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of reli-

gion] ... ."'O Minnesota's freedom of conscience clause is
expressed in strong language-rights of conscience shall never
be infringed, and interference with rights of conscience shall not
be permitted.'0 7 Given the breadth of this language and the invocation of religious liberty in the preamble to the constitution,
the court concluded that religion is a deeply held value for
Minnesotans.
The court next considered the "exception" language of section 16. Practices "inconsistent with the peace or safety of the
State" are not entitled to the protection of this clause.'1 8 The
plurality relied again on the strength of the language and the
importance of religious freedom to support its conclusion that
the Minnesota Constitution protects the religious practice unless a "compelling and overriding state interest" is demonstrated by the state.' 0 9
The structure of this provision arguably supports a method
of analysis similar to the three-part test of Sherbert v. Verner,"'
and the court's reliance on a "compelling interest" test suggests that the federal test was present in the minds of the plurality. The strong, mandatory language of section 16, limited
only by a narrow exception,"' suggests that if interference is
permissible, it can only be demonstrated by a compelling state
interest, as the plurality held." 2
The French dissent agreed with the outline of the plurality's
analysis. In particular, the dissent acknowledged that a compelling interest must be shown but disagreed on the outcome
of that showing, arguing that the state's interest in eradicating
106. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
[T]he state Bill of Rights expressly grants affirmative rights in the areas of
free press, free speech and religious worship while the corresponding federal provision simply attempts to restrain governmental action. In effect,
the language of the state constitution appears to afford Minnesota citizens
greater protection than does the Federal Constitution. It also serves to
lessen the force of United States Supreme Court decisions which only refer
to the more limited protection afforded by the Federal Bill of Rights.
Fleming & Nordby, supra note 12, at 67 (citations omitted).
107. See MINN. CONST. art, I, § 16 (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. French, 460 N.W.2d at 9.
110. 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
111. For a discussion of this caveat, see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
112. French, 460 N.W.2d at 9.
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discrimination was sufficiently compelling to deny the constitutional challenge."' The French dissent's analysis of the state
constitutional issue, however, is faulty in two respects.
First, the dissent argued that the plurality's interpretation of
the state's freedom of conscience clause" 4 failed to follow the
court's decision in Sports & Health Club." 5 Contrary to this argument, however, the opinion in Sports & Health Club provided
no analysis of the Minnesota Constitution. The Minnesota
Constitution was mentioned in only two places," 6 neither of
which involved any analysis of the language, meaning or purpose of the clause. In fact, Sports & Health Club relies entirely
onfederal precedent construing the first amendment of thefederal Constitution. Therefore, the Sports & Health Club opinion
provides no guidance or analysis on the extent of the protection extended by Minnesota's freedom of conscience clause.
of the
The dissent's reliance on Sports & Health Club for analysis
7
'
misplaced.'
therefore
is
Constitution
Minnesota
Second, the structure of the dissent's analysis of the constitutional issue can be faulted for its failure to identify and resolve the independent constitutional issues presented.
Although the dissent claimed to base its decision on the Minnesota Constitution, even a cursory reading of the opinion
demonstrates complete reliance on federal precedent construing the federal Constitution. The dissent engaged in the analysis typically seen in federal constitutional cases to support its
argument concerning a state constitutional provision, but completely failed to address the major factor relied on by the plurality in reaching its holding, the textual differences between
113. See id. at 16-18 (Popovich, C.J., dissenting).
114. "Our leading case [Sports & Health Club] establishes a four-part test for analyzing a request for an exemption from a statute based on the free exercise of religion
under both the federal and state constitutions .... " French, 460 N.W.2d at 14 (citation omitted). "The majority ignores the Sports & Health Club's holding. Since it is
not overruled, we are obliged to follow its precedent." Id. at 17 (citation omitted).
115. State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985).
116. Id. at 851 n.13.
117. The dissent argued that the Sports & Health Club decision, finding the state's
interest in eliminating discrimination a compelling interest, controlled the outcome.
See French, 460 N.W.2d at 17. Factually, these cases are very similar and, but for the
different constitutions on which the constitutional challenge was based, the outcomes
should have been consistent. The overwhelming reliance on federal precedent in
Sports & Health Club, however, diminishes the weight that holding carries when the
state constitution is at issue.
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the constitutions.1 18
The plurality's analysis of the freedom of conscience clause
is reminiscent of federal analysis of the first amendment. The
importance of the plurality's analysis, however, is that it is not
based on federal decisions interpreting the first amendment.
Rather, the court reached its decision based on state-specific
factors: the demanding language of the freedom of conscience
clause, and a recognition of the depth with which the state values religious freedom. A fine line separates decisions which
claim to analyze state constitutional claims and decisions which
actually engage in that analysis. The French plurality maintained that separation by relying only on factors unique to the
Minnesota Constitution to reach its result. Therefore, French
provides the basic framework for future freedom of conscience
challenges brought under the Minnesota Constitution.
B.

State v. Hershberger

In 1989, Amish residents of southeastern Minnesota who
travel on state highways by horse and buggy claimed their religious beliefs exempted them from a state statute requiring
slow-moving vehicles to display a blaze-orange triangular sign
when traveling on any public highway." 9 The defendants in
Hershbergerargued that their religion, which rejects loud colors
and "worldly symbols," prohibited them from displaying the
20
triangle on the back of their black, horse-drawn buggies.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, when initially presented with
this claim, based its decision on the first amendment to the federal Constitution,' 2 ' despite the presence of a state constitutional claim based on article I, section 16 of the Minnesota Bill
22
of Rights.
118. The dissent's reliance on Sports & Health Club for its interpretation of the
Minnesota Constitution is unsupported by that opinion. Sports & Health Club did not,
as the dissent suggests, interpret or analyze the claim under the state constitution.
119. Hershberger1, 444 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989), vacated and remanded, 110 S.
Ct. 1918, aff'd on remand, 462 N.W.2d 393 (1990). The statute requires a triangular
sign for all animal-drawn vehicles and agricultural machinery which are designed for
operation at a speed of less than twenty-five miles per hour. MINN. STAT. § 169.522,
subd. 1 (1988). The fourteen defendants in Hershberger, who operate horse-drawn
black buggies, believe that displaying "loud" colors and "worldly symbols" conflicts
with the teachings of their religion. Hershberger1, 444 N.W.2d at 284.
120. Id. at 283.
121. Id. at 284.
122. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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The United States Supreme Court vacated Hershberger I, and
remanded the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith.' 23 The Smith Court radically modi-

fied the three-part test developed in Sherbert v. Verner, 124 so that
upon remand to the Minnesota Supreme Court, it was unlikely
the Hershberger defendants2 5would succeed on a claim based on
the federal Constitution.

Thus, on remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court focused on
the state constitutional claim. Given the earlier French decision, the path was already partially paved for the court. Furthermore, the scenario was essentially the same: each
defendant sought an exemption from an otherwise valid statute, and the state claimed its competing interest in enforcing
the statutes prevailed over the defendants' religious beliefs.
The HershbergerII court began, as did the French court, with
the language of section 16: "Whereas the first amendment establishes a limit on government action at the point of prohibiting
the exercise of religion, section 16 precludes even an infringement
on or an interference with religious freedom."' 26 The court, in
relying on these language differences, thus recognized the possibility of different outcomes under the state and federal
constitutions.
The court then recognized that the limited nature of the
government exception granted by section 16 placed a corre123. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 110 S.Ct. 1918 (1990) (vacating the Minnesota
Supreme Court's decision in light of Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)). The Smith decision rejected a claim that the free
exercise clause in the federal Constitution protects criminal conduct that is inspired
by religious beliefs. This decision will likely have a serious effect on free exercise
claims. However, that discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
124. 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
125. The Smith Court held that
[i]t
is a permissible reading of the text . . .to say that if prohibiting the
exercise of religion ... is not the object of the [state law at issue] but merely
the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision,
the First Amendment has not been offended .... We have never held that
an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600. The Smith Court did not consider any burdens or compellipg state interests in reaching this result. Rather, Smith had the effect of condemning
the Hershberger defendants' federal claim. The defendants in Smith, like those in
Hershberger, sought exemption from a state statute that was "otherwise valid." The
Minnesota court, on remand, declined to consider this issue. See Hershberger 11, 462
N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990).
126. Hershberger 1I, 462 N.W.2d at 397 (emphasis in original).
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spondingly high burden on the state: "Minnesotans are afforded greater protection for religious liberties against
governmental action under the state constitution than under
the first amendment of the federal constitution."'127 Since the
challenged activity in this case directly impacted public safety,
i.e., buggies traveling on state roads, the court was faced with a
recognized exception, and therefore compelling interest, to
enforcement of religious beliefs. Relying on French, the court
held that the importance of religious freedom, reflected in the
language of section 16 and the preamble, required that religious freedom be accommodated by all possible means, including any alternative measures that satisfy the state's
interests.' 28 The Amish defendants had proposed an alternative, outlining their buggies with silver reflective tape. Since
the state had not demonstrated that this alternative would not
satisfy its public safety concerns, the defendants' constitutional
2 9
challenge was upheld.

The HershbergerH court's job was made easier by the earlier
French decision. The court already had the basic framework in
place and was faced only with an application of that framework.
The HershbergerH decision took the French holding one step
further, however, by adopting the least restrictive means test.
While the "compelling interest" and "least restrictive means"
tests are reminiscent of federal tests, 30 their use in this case is
justified by the structure of the clause to which they are applied. These concepts, which impose a stiff burden on the
state, comport with the extent of the protection extended by
section 16. More importantly, these concepts appear to be
consistent with earlier interpretations of state religious freedom clauses.
First, requiring the state to meet a demanding standard is
justified by the need to protect the strongly held value defined
by section 16.'13 Moreover, given the breadth of protection
conferred by section 16, the caveat language should be narrowly construed. 132 The sweeping nature of this language im127. Id.
128. Id. at 399.
129. Id.
130. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US. 398 (1963).
131. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-13, at 1251 (2d ed. 1988).
132. Application of the exception in this case also seems unwarranted because the
solutions proposed by the Amish accommodated safety concerns. The problems with
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plies that the religious exemption should be the rule, rather
than the exception.
Second, this interpretation is consistent with the few earlier
opinions addressing claims under section 16. Although the
court's previous interpretations of section 16 do not reflect unwavering support for religious freedom, the court has acknowledged the strength of the language in that section.' 33 For
example, the Minnesota Supreme Court has previously used
equally strong language in analyzing its religious freedom
clause. "[I]n framing state constitutions the idea was dominant to protect religious liberty. Divine worship according to
the dictates of the individual conscience was deemed essential
of importance to the state,
to the welfare of every person and
1 34
by the peoples of every state."'

encountering a black buggy traveling slowly during the day may be minimized by the
sight of the buggy, but the problem is exacerbated at night. The Amish therefore
proposed outlining their buggies in silver reflective tape, rather than use either of the
state's prescribed signs, to accommodate the state's safety concerns. Thus, the
buggy itself would serve as a warning during the day, and the tape would identify the
buggy at night. Additionally, the state's safety interests are served because the
county in which the majority of the Amish reside posts horse and buggy signs along
the county roads to alert nonresidents to the possibility of encountering the Amish
buggies. See Brief for Appellants at 19-22, Hershberger 1,444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn.
1989), vacated and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 1918, af'd on remand, 462 N.W.2d 393 (1990)

(No. C9-88-2623).
133. Similarly strong provisions are found in the constitutions of states near Minnesota. See, e.g., ARK. CoNsT. art. II, § 24 ("All men have a natural and indefeasible
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences
....");Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 5 ("[No human authority can control or interfere with
the rights of conscience .. ");N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("The free exercise of religion
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference shall be forever guaranteed in this state ....");S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("The
right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed."); Wis. CONST. art. I, § 18 ("The right of every person to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed .. . nor shall any
").But see
control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted ....
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3 ("The General Assembly shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....").
The language of other states' free exercise clauses is particularly important in
construing the breadth of Minnesota's clause. As territories achieved statehood, the
constitutional provisions of the state from which the territory was separated were
often adopted. See J. Dealey, GROWTH OF AMERICAN STATE CoNsTrruTloNs 9 (1915).
Thus, the significance of the federal Constitution and its free exercise clause is diminished. "[T]he real models consistently followed in making or revising constitutions
have been the constitutions of existing states and territories." Id.
134. Kaplan v. Independent School Dist. of Virginia, 171 Minn. 142, 146, 214
N.W. 18, 19 (1927). "No man must feel that his religion is tolerated. His constitu-

tional 'rights of conscience' should be indefeasible and beyond the control or interference of man. The Constitution says so." Id. at 156, 214 N.W. at 23 (Wilson, C.J.,
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Thus, the HershbergerII opinion added further to the framework for a state constitutional claim based on the freedom of
conscience. Again, the significance of HershbergerH is seen in
its independent interpretation of the state constitution. The
court was essentially left with only the state claim, rather than
with the competing federal and state claims. The court's approach to that single claim demonstrates the Minnesota
Supreme Court's willingness to enforce the protections provided by the Minnesota Bill of Rights.
CONCLUSION

The Minnesota Supreme Court's past decisions reflect an inconsistent approach to state constitutional claims. Although
the court has recently issued thoughtful, well-analyzed decisions involving state constitutional claims, there is no guarantee that a litigant presenting state and federal constitutional
challenges will see the state claim resolved. In order to ensure
the functional independence of the state constitution and its
bill of rights, the Minnesota judiciary should adopt a policy of
addressing and resolving state claims first when faced with
competing state and federal constitutional claims.
This approach promotes the interests and values protected
by the Minnesota Constitution, rather than leaving them dependant on unsatisfactory federal decisions. The Minnesota
dissenting). Unfortunately, in Kaplan, the court rejected the religious freedom claim.
See also Americans United Inc. as Protestants v. Independent School Dist. No. 622,
288 Minn. 196, 213, 179 N.W.2d 146, 155 (1970) ("We simply inject a caveat that the
limitations contained in the Minnesota Constitution are substantially more restrictive
than those imposed by [the first amendment of the United States Constitution].").
Although the Kaplan decision suggests Minnesota has a historic tradition of protecting religious freedom, no support for this position is found in the debates of
Minnesota's constitutional convention. These debates, recording the proceedings of
the separate Democratic and Republican conventions, are worthy reading for any
constitutional researcher. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 12, at 70-72 (discussing
the history of the separate conventions). Unfortunately, the religion clause of the
Minnesota Bill of Rights did not spark any debate. The reason for this may lie in the
fact that separate conventions were held by the state's two political parties.
From the fact that a portion of the Delegates-elect to the Convention, representing one of the great political parties of the Territory, not only refused to
co-operate with the Convention in its proceedings, but constituted for themselves a rival organization, leaving the body composed entirely of Democratic members, many topics usually forming the bone of contention in such
assemblies were disposed of with little discussion and almost entire unanimity ....

Smith, Reporter's Preface, THE DEBATES
TUTIONAL CONVENTION (1857).
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Constitution should be the primary focus for the Minnesota judiciary, thereby ensuring the enforcement of the constitutional
protections it extends to Minnesota citizens.
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